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In recent years, asbestos litigation has focused attention on the rolc of professionals in protecting workers and the broader public from exposure to dangerous substances. Many public health advocates believe there are certain substances, especially carcinogens, to which humans should not be exposed at any level bccausc thcy arc inhcrcntly dangcrous. Historically, however, occupational health professionals have assumed that anv toxic substance can be used in industrial proccsses if exposurc is kcpt below a spccified level at their own membership, the foundation raised serious questions about the validity of the standard. While agreeing that it would be most beneficial to be able to "state what are permissible thresholds of dustiness to which workmen are exposed," the committee concluded that "there is not available ... the knowledge upon which to base such thresholds." Nevertheless, it allowed that "there is evidence that a concentration of more than five million particles per cubic foot of a highly siliceous dust is dangerous" and thus recommended that as the limit.25
Johns Manville was successful in promulgating the 5-mppcfvalue as the threshold limit value for asbestos based on the view that asbestosis was a less serious disease than silicosis.26 In 1950, Vandiver Brown, Johns Manville's secretary and general attorney, observed the importance of the silica debate in shaping the asbestos standard itself. He questioned "whether there exists sufficient data correlating the disease [asbestosis] to the degree of exposure to warrant any determination that will even approximate accuracy," but he surmised that the asbestos threshold limit value may have been set "because it had already been prescribed for silicosis."27
The National Silicosis Conference adopted the 5-mppcf standard for silicosis as one below which workers would not experience disease but did not Second, the employer "would prefer a limit which will protect most workers, but he would rather not undergo the extra expense for providing for the most susceptible." Finally, workers themselves preferred "to have the limit set at a concentration where no one at all will be affected."49 In the best of circumstances, scientific evidence would determine the standard. But in reality, the differing relative power of participants in the process was critical.
Standards historically represented the perspectives of the first two participants identified by Elkins. During the New Deal, when the Air Hygiene Foundation and other industry-sponsored groups talked among themselves and among other professionals, this process was sometimes made explicit. F. S. Mallette and H. B. Meller, managing director of the Air Hygiene Foundation, pointed out the tendency among even industrial hygienists to be lulled "into false security by reliance on the protection given by strict adherence to these permissible limits." But rather than inform workers of the potential dangers they faced, the authors suggested that companies conduct "periodic physical evaluations" as a "biological check" for "concentrations of hazardous substances which had been sanctioned as being safe." They maintained that the very hazards of the job were effective devices for screening out workers whose physique left them susceptible to illness. Calling this process "industrial selection," they endorsed the idea that standards "are based on experience with workmen who are best fitted to withstand industrial hazards, those who are vulnerable to the exposure being weeded out by natural selection."50 In the Darwinian world of the factory, standards were set that protected the "average" worker while occupational illnesses and periodic screening for disease became tools in the natural process of industrial selection. Those who became sick were de facto defined as "unfit."
In the years following the acceptance of the silica threshold limit value, a few studies continued to show that workers were still getting silicosis. These concen- trate their reform efforts on this group: "The average abrasive blasting company cannot afford the luxury of a safety or industrial hygiene staff or consultant. The supplier is their staff or consultant." 62 The indictment of protective equipment provided by Blair's report was serious enough. But shortly thereafter, NIOSH received evidence that silicosis, far from being a historical entity, remained a serious problem. In mid-1974, two other NIOSH-supported projects reported on cases of silicosis among shipyard workers and steel fabricators in New Orleans and elsewhere. One report by Morton Ziskind indicated that the best way of protecting workers was to consider alternatives to sand as an abrasive in sandblasting.63
The response of NIOSH officials was swift. In 1974, NIOSH issued a criteria document recommendation for a crystalline silica standard that recommended that "occupational exposure shall be controlled so that no worker is exposed to a time-weighted average concentration of free silica greater than 50 micrograms per cubic meter of air." The document further suggested that silica be banned as an abrasive in blasting:
uncontrolled abrasive blastingwith silica sand is such a severe silicosis hazard that special attention must be given to this problem. Silica sand, or other materials containing more than 1% free silica, should be prohibited as an abrasive substance in abrasive blasting cleaning operations. 64 A few months after this document appeared, a meeting at the Industrial Health Foundation in Pittsburgh brought together industry representatives, industrial health specialists, and government. At that time, many even within industry agreed that "silicosis, of all the pneumoconioses, is identified as claiming the largest number of victims, either alone or with tuberculosis."65 J. P. O'Neill, chief of OSHA's Division of Health Standards Development, explained that "silicosis apparently is not, as they once hoped, an occupational disease that would disappear." Instead, "the prevalence of silicosis has not really dropped at all. We have much better methods of control, but we need a standard that would be much more effective, and be based upon better data than the present standard that is on the books." 66 The response from the affected indus- Slines' appeal to keep the association open, however, was unsuccessful. By June 1983, in a special meeting of the association's board of directors, it was noted that "regulatory activity in and from Washington is at a dormant level, . . . no foreseen push on abrasive blasting is seen as long as the present administration is in power, [and] . . . requests to [the association] for information from members are rare." The board of directors therefore concluded that "the association should be put on hold."78 The records of the organization were placed in storage and the offices closed.
The Renewed Interest in Revising the Slica Standard
The recent election of a Democratic president, and the attempt to revitalize the Department of Labor in general and NIOSH and OSHA in particular, has once again led to a reconsideration of the silica standard. From 1993 to 1994 alone, two major conferences on silica-related diseases were held in the United States. In the 1930s, with a severe liability crisis forcing industry to act, standards were established that reflected the economic and technical capabilities of equipment manufacturers, industries that used sand, and insurance companies that paid liability claims. During the generally conservative political environment of the years following World War II, business efforts to downplay the seriousness of the silica hazard along with the incorporation of silicosis into state workers compensation laws led to the cessation of efforts to revise the silica standard. Despite continuing studies that indicated that silicosis remained a problem, few voices called for legislative action. In the 1970s, following the passage of Occupational Safety and Health Act and the establishment of NIOSH and OSHA, the issue of the standard once again became important. It appears that only the concerted efforts of affected industries and the conservative triumph of the 1980s forestalled the banning of sand as an abrasive in blasting.
Today, we tend to think that standards have evolved from the intrinsic logic of scientific and technological imperatives. Better equipment and greater understanding of the physiology and chemistry of disease, for example, have led to more accurate measurement of toxins, more precise estimates of danger, and greater safety for the worker. However, we have shown that economic concerns and technical feasibility interacted to promote the concept of safety thresholds for specific substances and led to the adoption of standards. These standards, in turn, were publicly promoted as safety levels, when, in fact, business representatives and technical experts understood them to be a compromise that represented the power of different competing interests. In the face of a technical inability to measure less than 5 mppcf of dust and the scientific uncertainty regarding what is a safe level, industry spokesmen argued against lowering threshold limit values because such an act would force industry to bear the costs of potentially unnecessary safety measures. From the late 1930s through the late 1960s, this argument was accepted by industrial hygienists and public health officials, providing a powerful political rationale for maintaining the value despite ongoing evidence that workers continued to get silicosis.
Following the establishment of OSHA and NIOSH, and a growing awareness that some substances are dangerous at any level, a serious effort arose to lower the threshold limit value for silica to the point where it would be virtually banned in some industries. Faced with continuing case findings of silicosis among workers in the dusty trades and the ongoing scientific uncertainty regarding a truly safe level, officials in NIOSH and later OSHA sought ways to minimize the danger to the workforce, even if it meant increased costs to industries. They argued that it was the responsibility of government agencies to err on the side of safety rather than on the side of the possibly adverse economic impact to industry. In the 1980s, the older argument that had prevailed for most of the century once again gained ascendancy. Although in the 1990s the arguments will be framed primarily in epidemiological and technical terms, the historical record indicates that important economic and social issues are at work in framing the questions of when and in what amounts silica is safe or dangerous. [ 
